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MEMORANDUM
ON NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE MPLA
1975-1998
The Angolan conflict has very deep-seated historical roots. In order to bring
to memory facts that are an integral part of the causes of the war in Angola,
the UNITA Standing Committee publishes the MPLA non-compliances. These failures
are vis-à-vis the celebrated Agreements and Understanding between UNITA and the
MPLA.
With this retrospective document the Standing Committee aims not only to
contribute to the debate about the longevity of the Angolan conflict but also to
ensure that its juridical-historical side is not falsified. At the same time it
attempts to reiterate that any solution [to end the conflict] need to be realist
and long lasting.
The following refer to non-compliance by the MPLA:
1 - The MPLA violated the Alvor Agreement signed in January 1975 between
UNITA, MPLA, FNLA and Portugal. The Agreement was the juridical instrument that
would have led Angola to its independence.
a) The MPLA introduced a Cuban Mercenary Force
in Angola during the period January - March, and August - November 1975.
b) It massacred UNITA militants in Pica-Pau,
Luanda and Cassamba [Moxico Province] in May and June 1975 respectively.
c) It denounced the Nakuru [Kenya] Agreement
signed in June 1975 by initiating the war in August the same year and slaying
700 UNITA militants in Dondo [Kwanza Norte Province].
d) On August 7, 1975 the MPLA shot at the
aircraft that was to transport the UNITA President overseas. e) The violations
of the Alvor and Nakuru Agreements culminated with the unilateral proclamation
of Independence on November 11,1975 by the MPLA Central Committee, in the
voice of Agostinho Neto. It was done with the complicity of the Portuguese
authorities and the 12,000 member Cuban Expeditionary Force.
2 - Regarding the Bicesse Agreement:
a) In June and July 1992 the MPLA violated the Bicesse Agreement when,
unilaterally created and flaunted throughout the country the Anti-riot Police.
b) In October and November 1992, after the self-evident electoral fraud,
the MPLA of Eduardo dos Santos assassinated UNITA leaders sent to negotiate a
way out of the crisis caused by the electoral fraud. The Negotiating Team was
led by Jeremias Kalandula Chitunda, the UNITA Vice-President and included
Adolosi Paulo Mango Alicerces, the Party Secretary General and Elias Salupeto
Pena, Head of UNITA in the Joint Political Military Commission. They were
savagely assassinated. Their assassination was followed by a countrywide
political and tribal genocide that left 40,000 dead.
3 - In December 1993 and June 1994, while the Lusaka Negotiations [which
led to the signing of the Lusaka Agreement] where underway, Jose Eduardo dos
Santos perpetrated two attempts on the life of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, the
UNITA President. It is worthwhile to recall here that the United Nations
investigated the aforementioned attempts on his life through UNAVEM - II. It
concluded that the perpetrator of the acts was the regime of Jose Eduardo dos
Santos. It must be emphasized here that after the June 1994 attempt the MPLA
convinced many Diplomatic Missions throughout the world that it had accomplished
its objective. Those Diplomatic Missions undertook in turn to disseminate
Futungo's falsehood.
4 - On October 28, 1994 Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNAVEM-II sent the
late Alioune Blondin Beye, the mediator of the negotiation process to convince
the UNITA Leadership to initial the Lusaka Protocol. In exchange the forces of
Jose E. Dos Santos would not take by storm the City of Huambo. The facts later
proved otherwise. The Lusaka Protocol was initialed on October 31, 1994.
The following events were a violation of what was promised: ·
On 11/9/94 - J. E. Santos' forces seized the city of Huambo; On
11/15/94 - Signing of cease-fire in Lusaka;
On 11/19/94 - J. E. Santos' forces seized the city of Uige; · On 11/20/94 -
Formal signing of the Lusaka Protocol; ·
On 11/22/94 - J. E. Santos' forces seized the city of Cuito Cuanavale.
5 - From May to September 1996, during the implementation of the Lusaka
Protocol, JES promised to allocate the second Vice Presidency to UNITA.
However, after tedious negotiations he failed to give any substance to the
position. It should be noted that the President of Republic of Gabon urged,
without success, JES to be specific and transparent on the role of the second
Vice-President.
6 - Contrary to the agreement of the parties, the MPLA extended
unilaterally the National Assembly's mandate on October 13, 1996 in what
amounted to a blatant constitutional coup.
7 - Before, during and after the Lusaka peace negotiations, the triple
zero clause contained in the Bicesse Accords was still in effect. However, the
MPLA/JSE never stopped buying weapons. Ambassadors accredited to Luanda at
the time including the US Ambassador Don Steinberg, can confirm that in 1995
they saw many war tanks being unloaded at Luanda port and taken to FAA military
stores.
8 - In the framework of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the
extension of State Administration should have been the highest expression of
reconciliation. However, it became in reality, the vehicle through which the
regime forces carried out the following acts:
a) Massacres of UNITA cadre and militants. More than
1,500 were killed. MONUA (UN Mission in Angola) confirmed the massacre at
Kangandala in 1998.
b) Destruction of UNITA assets and symbols.
c) Total disregard for the commercial agreement
reached on UNITA finances after the return of Luzanba to government authority.
US officials were guarantors of this agreement.
d) Total disregard for the agreement reached on June 19, 1998 calling for
the rectification of mistakes and redressing of excesses committed during the
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
9 - In the general implementation of the Lusaka Protocol the regime of JES
failed to:
a) Disarm its militia. On the contrary we have
witnessed its growth.
b) Repatriate the mercenaries who instead became advisers to JES forces and
owners of private security companies in partnerships with JES Generals.
c) Quarter the riot police and scale down its
equipment to be compatible with its stated mission. On the contrary it became
more aggressive flexing its muscle against any legal rally.
d) Appoint the governors, vice-governors and ambassadors indicated by UNITA
as stipulated in the Lusaka Protocol.
e) On August 30, 1998, JES suspended all UNITA
deputies to the National Assembly and members of the GURN. At the same time,
he announced the termination of dialogue with the UNITA leadership based in
Andulo.
f) On September 2, 1998, JES created another interlocutor in Luanda,
calling it CRU (UNITA Renewal Committee) and vowed to conclude the
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol with his new partners.
g) From September 1998 until MONUA withdrew from
Angola in 1999, JES successfully obstructed, any contact between the then UNSG
Special Representative, Mr. Issa Dialo with the leadership of UNITA in Andulo.
h) In September 1998, JES forced the UNITA members of Parliament and those
in the GURN, to "individually clarify" their position. The goal was
to co-opt and used them to divide UNITA as it was already done with the FNLA a
few months earlier.
i) On October 18, 1998 JES regime assassinated, by
poisoning, General Arlindo Chenda Pena "Ben-Ben", FAA Deputy Chief
of Staff.
j) The regime's disregard of the Lusaka protocol reached its highest point
when JES announced the death sentence for Dr. J.M. Savimbi and declared war on
UNITA during the opening session of his party's IV Congress on December 5,
1998. This history of JES non-compliance with signed agreements before and
after independence between the MPLA and UNITA, has been easily forgotten to
suit the interests of certain groups and governments. We wish to point out
that this non-compliance is the historical and juridical base for a legitimate
armed defense.
Despite the sacrifices, UNITA will carry out its struggle until JES
understands definitively that he has led the country in the wrong direction.
Angola February 7, 2000
The Permanent Committee
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